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WATERS v. STATE
liability in Maryland follows a hardened path."s In a
recent case, State v. Baltimore County,9 where plaintiff's
intestate was negligently killed by a policeman, the Court
of Appeals, in upholding the conventional governmental-
proprietary distinction, stated:
"... the point was settled in the case of Wynkoop
v. Hagerstown, 159 Md. 594. * * * If, as the appellants
argue, the rule ought to be changed so as to enlarge
the liability of municipal corporations, it must be
done by the Legislature and not by this Court."6
If the Maryland Legislature should respond to a call for
remedial legislation, the Schuster case and New York's
experience with a statutory waiver of tort immunity will
serve as a timely warning that the courts will look for a
definite and clear statement of the extent of liability
undertaken.
KALMAN R. HrrLmAN
Unemployment Compensation - Recovery Of
Benefits Paid
Waters v. State1
Appellant, who was employed by a radiator company,
was discharged on October 18, 1956, and promptly filed,
claim under the Unemployment Insurance Act.2 Subse-
quent to his receiving payments, an arbitrator, pursuant
to a collective bargaining agreement between the employer
and the union, directed that he be reinstated and "'be
made whole for the time lost by reason of his discharge.' "I
Pursuant to the order, appellant was reinstated and re-
ceived $1,809.91 in back pay, no deduction being made for
T See supra, n. 16. 'Statutory liability in Maryland Is confined to three
areas:
1) where employees of the government are Injured while engaged in
extra-hazardous work (Workmen's Compensation Act, 8 MD. CoDE (1957)
Art. 101, § 33) ;
2) where police commandeer a motor vehicle (6 MD. CoDE (1957), Art.
66%, § 180a, b) ;
3) where there Is destruction of property 'by riot or tumultuous assem-
blage (7 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 82, §§ 1-4).
'218 Md. 271, 146 A. 2d' 28 (1958).
Ibid., 273.
S220 Md. 337, 152 A. 2d 81- (1959).
D. CODE (1951) Art. 95A, now codified in 8 MD. CoDE (1957) Art. 95A.
Supra, n. 1, 340.
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unemployment benefits. Subsequently, the Unemployment
Insurance Fund, (hereinafter referred to as the Fund),
having made a redetermination of the claim and having
determined that the benefits paid appellant were an over-
payment which should be recovered under Section 16(d)
of the Act4 brought suit to recover these benefits. From a
judgment adverse to the appellant in the Superior Court
of Baltimore City, an appeal was taken.
The Court of Appeals, in holding that the Fund could
not recover the benefits paid to the appellant under either
Section 17(d) or a common law c6unt for unjust enrich-
ment, reasoned that: Appellant had been unemployed
within the meaning of the Act during the period for
which benefits were paid; the payments were not made as
a result of any non-disclosure or misrepresentation of a
material fact by the Appellant; the Appellant had, as a
result, received benefits which were not actually due
him, but Section 16(d) did not provide the necessary
means 'by which the Fund could recoup itself and, since the
statute set up a specific and exclusive remedy, there could
be no other means of recoupment than as provided in the
statute.
The Fund contended that, since the employee was
wrongfully discharged, wages were "payable" to him
throughout the period and that he was, therefore, not "un-
employed" within the meaning of the Act. The Court felt,
however, that Section 19(1)' of the Act, defining wages,
meant "wages currently payable" rather than "wages le-
gally due and, payable under a contingency."6 It is quite
evident that the General Assembly in d-afting the Act
meant it to mean such on looking at Sections 5(b)7 and
'MD. CODE (1951) Art. 95A, § 16(d), now codified in 8 MD. CODEM (1957)
Art. 95A, § 17(d), states:
"Any person who, by reason of the non-disclosure or misrepresenta-
tion by him or by another, of a material fact (irrespective of whether
such non-disclosure or misrepresentation was known or fraudulent)
has received any sum as 'benefits under this article while any condi-
tions for receipt of benefits imposed 'by this article were not fulfilled
in his case, or while he was disqualified from receiving benefits, shall,
in the discretion of the Board either be liable to have such sum
deducted from any future benefits payable to him under this article
or shall be liable to repay to the Executive Director for the Unem-
ployment Insurance Fund, a sum equal to the amount received by
him, and such sum shall be collectible in the manner provided in
sec, 15(f) of this article for the collection of past due contributions."
MD. CoN (1951) Art. 95A, § 19(1), now codified in 8 Mn. CODE (1957)
Art. 95A, § 20(n).
0 Supra, n. 1, 348.
7MD. COnE (1951) Art. 95A, § 5(b), now codified in 8 MD. CODE (1957)
Art. 95A, § 6(b).
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5 (c) ,s which respectively disqualify an employee for bene-
fits when he is discharged for wilful misconduct or as a
disciplinary measure.9 No mention is made in the Act
as to persons who are wrongfully discharged. It is true
that subsequent to appellant's release an arbitration, pro-
ceeding established that such discharge was wrongful, but
it must be taken into account that throughout that period
the employer was insisting that he was discharged for
good cause. Waters was unemployed through no fault of
his own, and the mere fact that the dismissal was wrongful
does not alleviate his financial condition during the job-
less period. Such circumstances, it seems, would come
within the intent of the Act as expressed in two earlier
cases, which point out the purpose of the Act as being to
prevent economic insecurity and, involuntary unemploy-
ment.'0
The next question to confront the Court was whether
such payment by the Fund was induced by any non-
disclosure or misrepresentation on the part of the appel-
lant. As the facts disclosed, the Fund was as aware of the
pending arbitration proceedings as the employee. Section
16(d) provides for recovery where there has been a non-
disclosure or misrepresentation of a material fact, al-
though innocent." In construing this section the Court
felt the "material fact", referred to in the section, meant
an existing fact and not merely a contingent event "which
may or many not occur in the future."' 2 Such a construc-
tion follows the rule underlying recovery against fraud,
that the misrepresentation must be of an existing fact and
not of some future event or expression of opinion'"
Similar results are to be found in other States. The
Court called attention to Hill v. Review Board of Indiana
'MD. CODE (1951) Art. 95A, § 5(c), now 8 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 95A,§ 6(c).
'See Note, Unemployment Insurance Benefits - Refusal to Answer
"Security" Questions as Wilful Misconduct, 19 Md. L. Rev. 332 (1959).
"'Saunders v. Maryland Unemployment Compensation Board, 188 Md.
677, 53 A. 2d 579 (1947) ; Maryland Unemployment Board v. Albrecht, 183
Md. 87, 36 A. 2d 666 (1944).
1 Supra, n. 4.
12 Supra, n. 1, 349.
IsSchnader v. Brooks, 150 Md. 52, 132 A. 381 (1926); Boulden v.
Stilwell, 100 Md. 543, 552, 60 A. 609 (1905).
Judge Prescott, In writing the dissent, felt that such a construction
would preclude recoupment under all circumstances except as specified
within the section prescribing penalties for "Unlawful Acts." He pointed
out that if payments were made through some mistake of fact, as ex-
cessive benefits being paid to a Jobless employee, no recovery would be
forthcoming. This, in his opinion, would be very unfortunate.
1960]
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Employment Security Division,4 where it was held, under
a statute analgous to that of Maryland, that the fund could
only recover benefits it had paid when there was a non-
disclosure or misrepresentation on the part of the claimant.
The dissent in the present case attempted to distinguish
this case contending that the Indiana statute15 conferred
jurisdiction on the Review Board to recoup and not on a
court of general jurisdiction, and, therefore, was not rele-
vant to the problem in point, i.e., whether recoupment can
only be granted by a court of general jurisdiction when
there is non-disclosure or misrepresentation. This dis-
tinction seems merely to be grasping at insignificant points
which do not clearly differentiate the cases. Moreover, a
holding similar to that reached in the Maryland and
Indiana cases has, been reached under a statute of like
import in Idaho. 6 Even though such results are viewed
by the dissent as unfortunate, they are nevertheless the
only possibility under our present law.
Admitting the recovery could not be had under Article
95A, the Fund finally maintained that it could ibe had, in
the alternative, under a common law count for money had
and received. The Court, in repudiating this contention,
pointed out that the Unemployment Compensation Act
is a remedial statute and has as its objective protecting
those unemployed through no fault of their own.1 The
Act plainly sets out the limits upon recovery or recoup-
ment. The Court followed the phrase of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius in determining that since the legislature
specifically set forth one remedy under Section 17(d) it,
by implication, excluded any other.
The dissent was unable to accept such a theory and
instead cited State v. Rucker18 where recovery was al-
lowed against the employer under a count for money had
and received. The fact situation in that case was similar
to the instant case in that the employee was discharged
wrongfully, received unemployment compensation, and
was subsequently reinstated with an award for back pay
less income earned elsewhere (including Unemployment
Compensation benefits). Then the employer withheld an
amount equal to the Unemployment Compensation benefits
14 124 Ind. App. 83, 112 N.E. 2d 218 (1953).
BURNS' INDIANA STATUTES (ISupp. 1951) § 52-1537.
Claim of Sapp, 75 Idaho 65, 266 P. 2d 1027 (1954), which found that
under the Idaho Statute recovery could be had only if there was a non-
disclosure or misrepresentation (even if innocent).
17 Supra, n. 10.Is 211 Md. 153, 126 A. 2d 846 (1956).
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but did not turn it over to the Fund. The Court allowed
a judgment against the employer for the amount withheld
on the theory of unjust enrichment. In its decision the
Court pointed out:
"It is not necessary that we decide whether appellant
can recover from Bethlehem (employer) under the
provisions of that statute (Art. 95A, Sec. 17(d) ). Even
if we should assume without deciding, that recovery
against the employee would not lie under the statute,
we find nothing in the statute that would deny re-
covery against the employer or third party under
common law principles."1
The Rucker case is distinguishable on the grounds that the
employer was the person who received the payment un-
justly, whereas in the instant case it was the employee
to whom the benefit accrued. Under the situation in the
Rucker case a common count recovery will lie since the
statute in no way expresses any intent to benefit employers
or to set up exclusive remedies for recovery against them.
In reviewing the opinion of the Court one can discern
two distinct theories as to the intent of the Unemployment
Compensation Act, Section 16 (d). The majority constantly
strived for strict construction of the provision, whereas
the dissent stressed the necessity for conjunctive ap-
plication of common law principles. In that the Sec-
tion is in derogation of the common law and provides
for a separate and distinct remedy in the circumstance
in which it may be used, the possibility of alter-
native common. law recovery can not be realized. The
result of the case appears to be unfortunate. Undoubtedly
the dissent resorted to its various theories to make up
for the deficiencies of the statute. The Act makes no provi-
sion for recovery from employees where benefits are,
through subsequent events, found to amount to unjust en-
richment. But the job of the Court is not to legislate; it can
only interpret and apply existing law. Although a court
may interpret a statute in different ways in various situa-
tions, it cannot change the obvious meaning and effect of
a statute as the dissent desired to do in the instant case.
The answer to the problem lies with the legislature, which
alone possesses the power to amend existing law.
Steps were taken by the Indiana legislature after the




recovery from an employee of payment to which, through
subsequent events, he is no longer entitled." To alleviate
the situation in Maryland it is suggested that the present
Section 17 of Article 95A be amended. The following
provision is, therefore, submitted to broaden Section
17(d) :
Any person who, because of the subsequent receipt of
income deductible from benefits which is allocable to
the time for which benefits were paid, becomes not
entitled to such benefits under this act, shall be liable
to repay such amount to the Executive Director for
the Unemployment Insurance Fund.
WILBERT H. SIROTA
Extension Of Absolute Privilege To Executive
Officers Of Government Agencies
Barr v. Matteol
Plaintiffs, employees of the Office of Rent Stabilization,
had sponsored a terminal leave plan in 1950 which became
the subject of congressional criticism in 1953. The de-
fendant, acting director of the agency, had disapproved of
the plan. Without defendant's knowledge, a letter promul-
gating the plan was drafted by one of the plaintiffs and set
out over the defendant's name, which his secretary signed.
The letter provoked criticism from the Senate which was
reported in the press.2 As the acting director, the defendant
received inquiries as to the agency's position on the matter.
Consequently he issued a press release declaring his in-
tention to suspend the plaintiffs and expressing the opinion
that the plan was against government policy.' Plaintiffs
brought an action for libel, charging that the press release
coupled with the contemporaneous news reports disclosing
senatorial criticism of the plan defamed them and that
the publication had been actuated by malice. The District
Court overruled the defendant's plea that he was pro-
tected by either a qualified or absolute privilege. The
Court of Appeals, in affirming the judgment of the District
0 BURNS' INDIANA STATUTES (Supp. 1959) § 53-1537(b).
1 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
9 See 99 Gong. Rec. (1953) 868-8T-1.
3 For text of the news release see. 'Barr v. Matteo, 8upra, n. 1, 567-568,
fn. 5.
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